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Abstract
This paper extends the standard overlapping generations model of
capital accumulation by introducing consumption externalities. It is
assumed that each generation’s felicity depends on the social level of
benchmark consumption as well as on its own consumption. Since the
benchmark consumption is represented by the average consumption
of all agents, the contemporaneous consumption externalities are de-
termined by both intragenerational and intergenerational interactions
among the consumers. Given this setting, we show that even in a
simple model with a logarithmic utility function, the presence of con-
sumption externalities may significantly aﬀect the dynamic behavior
and steady-state characterization of the economy. We also reveal that
the same conclusion holds in an endogenous growth model in which
production externalities sustain continuing growth.
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generational externalities, intragenerational externalities
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1 Introduction
Recently, there is a renewed interest in the role of consumption externali-
ties in macroeconomics. Earlier studies on this issue such as Abel (1990)
and Gal´ı (1994) introduce consumption external eﬀects into the asset pricing
models in order to resolve the discrepancies between theoretical outcomes
and empirical findings. Therefore, those studies focus on the external eﬀects
of consumption on the individual decision making or on the behavior of asset
markets. In contrast, the recent investigations on macroeconomic implica-
tions of consumption externalities examine the issue in the dynamic, general
equilibrium context and discuss a wider range of topics than those consid-
ered by the earlier studies. For example, the recent studies have explored
the eﬀect of consumption externalities on optimal taxation (Ljungqvist and
Uhlig 2000), equilibrium eﬃciency (Alonso-Carrera et al. 2003 and Liu and
Turnovsky 2003), indeterminacy and sunspots (Weder 2000), as well as on
the relationship between savings and long-term economic growth (Carroll et
al. 1997 and 2000, and Harbaugh 1996).1
A common feature of the existing investigations on consumption exter-
nalities in the macroeconomics literature is that most of them employ the
representative agent models. In general, introduction of consumption exter-
nalities into the standard representative-agent models of growth and business
cycles does not produce significant qualitative changes in dynamic behavior
of the economy: see Liu and Turnovsky (2003) for a detailed discussion on
equilibrium dynamics of the standard representative agent model with con-
sumption externalities. Although consumption externalities may yield large
quantitative eﬀects that would be relevant for welfare implications and pol-
icy making decisions, the dynamic properties of model economies are usually
the same as those of models without consumption external eﬀects. Such a
conclusion is in contrast to the eﬀect of production externalities, which may
alter the dynamic behavior of the economy in a fundamental manner.
Departing from the recent studies, we examine the role of consumption
external eﬀects in an overlapping generations economy. We extend the stan-
dard two-period lived OLG model of capital accumulation by introducing ex-
1A closely related issue to our discussion is habit formation of consumers that has been
widely discussed in the literature (Campbell and Cochrane 1999, Fuhre 2000 and many
others). It is also to be noted that a large number of studies have treated both consumption
externalities and habit formation at the same time: see, for example, Alvarez-Cuadrado
et al. (2004), Abel (1990), Carroll et al. (1997) and (2000). Habit formation seems to
be less relevant in our two- period lived OLG framework. Additionally, the models with
social status in which utility of the agent is directly aﬀected by the level of wealth holding
(e.g. Futagami and Shibata 1998) are also related to our study.
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ternal eﬀects among consumption activities of the agents. The key diﬀerence
between the representative agent and the OLG settings is that the contem-
poraneous external eﬀects of consumption involve the intergenerational as
well as intragenerational externalities in the OLG economy. Unlike the rep-
resentative agent model, heterogeneity of agents inevitably exists in the OLG
model, and hence contemporaneous interactions among consumption activi-
ties of the agents would be much more complex in the OLG economy than
those in the representative agent economy. This suggests that the presence of
consumption externalities generates more fundamental eﬀects on equilibrium
dynamics of the economy in an OLG setting than in the representative-agent
counterpart. The central purpose of this paper is to confirm this prediction
by using a simple model of an OLG economy.
The general conclusion of this paper is that the dynamic behavior of the
OLG economy heavily depends on how the consumption external eﬀects are
specified. We find that even a simple model with a logarithmic utility and a
Cobb-Douglas production function may yield multiple steady states and lo-
cal indeterminacy of equilibrium. More specifically, if there are positive con-
sumption externalities (i.e. the social level of benchmark consumption pos-
itively aﬀects the individual utility), then there generally exists dual steady
states. In addition, one of the steady-states exhibits local indeterminacy so
that sunspot-driven fluctuations may be observed. In contrast, the external
eﬀects are negative in the sense that the utility of each agent decreases with
the average consumption levels of other agents, the steady-state equilibrium
tends to be uniquely determined. The local dynamics near the steady state,
however, may or may not show determinacy of equilibrium. We reveal that
those results may hold not only in the standard neoclassical environment in
which continuing growth is infeasible without introducing exogenous techni-
cal progress but also in the endogenously growing economy where production
externalities sustain continuing growth. Although our finding are established
in a specified, simple framework, those reveal that consumption externalities
would play a relevant role in the OLG economy.
It is to be pointed out that Abel (2003) also introduces consumption
externalities into the Diamond model of overlapping generations. The basic
model structure of his article is essentially the same as ours. The central
concern of Abel (2003) is to characterize the optimal income taxation in the
steady state equilibrium. Therefore, equilibrium dynamics out of the steady
state is out of touch in his study. Since the main focus of our discussion is
to examine dynamic behavior of the model economy, Abel (2003) and our
paper may be considered complements rather than substitutes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the analytical frame-
work with general functional forms. In Section 3, by using a logarithmic
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utility function and a Cobb-Douglas production function, we investigate the
existence and stability of the steady-state equilibrium. Section 4 introduces
production externalities into the base model and consider the eﬀects of con-
sumption externalities in an endogenous growth setting. Concluding remarks
are given in Section 5.
2 The Base Model
2.1. Consumption
We consider a two-period lived overlapping generations economy where
in each period only two types of agents are alive: young and old. Agents
are identical within the generation. Population is constant over time and
the number of agents in each generation is normalized to one. The utility
function of agents in cohort born at the beginning of period t is
Ut = u (ct, Et) + βu (xt+1, Et+1) , 0 < β < 1, (1)
where ct denotes consumption when the agents are young and xt+1 is con-
sumption when they are old. Et and Et+1 express the external eﬀects on the
felicities in period t and t + 1, respectively. The instantaneous utility func-
tions, u (ct, Et) and u (x,Et+1) , are assumed to be monotonically increasing
and strictly concave in ct and xt+1.
We assume that the consumption externalities depend on the bench mark
levels of average consumption in each period:
Et = E
0 (c¯t, x¯t) ,
Et+1 = E
1 (x¯t+1, c¯t+1) ,
where c¯t+i and x¯t+i (i = 01, 2) respectively represent the average consump-
tion of the young and old generations. Here, we assume that functions E0 (.)
and E1 (.) increase with its each argument. The benchmark consumption
in period t, Et, depends on t-th generation’s average consumption as well
as on the average consumption of the generation born at the beginning of
t − 1. Similarly, the benchmark consumption in period t + 1, Et+1, contains
the average consumption levels of both t-th and t+1-th generations. There-
fore, even though we consider the contemporaneous external eﬀects alone,
we should deal with the intergenerational externalities2.
2In the representative agent models, it is frequently assumed that the consumption
externalities are perceived by the agents with a delay. The studies on ”catching up with
the Joneses” (e.g. Abel 1990) and ”external habit formation” (e.g. Carroll et al. 1997) are
3
To characterize the external eﬀects on the level of felicity, we follow the
taxonomy presented by Dupor and Liu (2003): the consumers’ preferences
exhibit ”jealousy” if the external eﬀects are negative, i.e. ∂u/∂Et+i < 0
(i = 0, 1) , while they show ”admiration” if positive externalities are present
so that ∂u/∂Et+i > 0 (i = 0, 1) . In addition, preferences display ”keeping
up with the Joneses (KUJ)” if ∂2u/∂ct+i∂Et+i > 0 (i = 0, 1), and they show
”running away from the Joneses (RAJ)” if ∂2u/∂ct+i∂Et+i < 0 (i = 0, 1) .
Intuitively, KUJ means that each consumer wants to be similar to others,
because an additional consumption yields a larger increment of utility when
other agents attain higher levels of consumption. In contrast, RAJ means
that each consumer prefers being diﬀerent from others: her marginal utility
is lowered if other consume more3.
We assume that agents work when they are young and they do not work
when old. Each young agent supplies one unit of labor. Hence, the budget
constraints in period t and t+ 1 are respectively given by the following:
wt = ct + st,
xt+1 = Rt+1st.
where Rt+1 denotes the gross rate of interest in period t + 1, wt is the real
wage rate and st is saving of the young agent. The intertemporal budget
constraint for the household is thus written as
ct +
xt+1
Rt+1
= wt. (2)
The agents born at the beginning of period t selects ct and xt+1 to maxi-
mize Ut subject to the life-time budget constraint of (2) .When solving their
optimization problem, the agents take the external eﬀects, Et and Et+1, as
typical examples in this direction of research. It is worth noting that, by using an OLG
model with capital formation, de la Croix (1996) assumes that the young agents’ felicity
is aﬀected by the consumption level of their parents in their young age. In our notation,
the felicity function used by de la Croix is:
Ut = u (ct, c¯t−1) + βu (xt+1) .
This kind of intergenerational taste inheritance is not considered in our discussion. (See
also Chapter 5 in de la Croix and Michel (2002) for a further discussion on habit formation
in the OLG models.)
3As emphasized by Dupor and Liu (2003), jealousy (admiration) and KUJ (RAJ) are
diﬀerent concepts and they may or may not coincide with each other, depending on the
parametric specification of the utility function. See also Chugh (2003) for a moralization
of Dupor and Liu (2003).
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given. The first-order conditions for an optimum yields
βu1 (xt+1, Et+1)
u1 (ct, Et)
=
1
Rt+1
. (3)
By use of (2) and (3) , we may express the optimal levels of consumption in
such a way that
ct = φ
c (wt, Rt+1, Et, Et+1) ,
xt+1 = φ
x (wt, Rt+1, Et, Et+1) .
Since we have assumed that population of each cohort is one, in the symmet-
ric equilibrium we can set c¯t = ct and x¯t = xt for all t. Hence, ct and xt+1
satisfy
ct = φ
c
¡
wt, Rt+1, E
0 (ct, xt) , E
1(xt+1, ct+1)
¢
,
xt+1 = φ
x
¡
wt, Rt+1, E
0 (ct, xt) , E
1(xt+1, ct+1)
¢
.
As a result, the equilibrium levels of ct and xt+1 may be written as
ct = C (wt, Rt+1, xt, ct+1) , (4)
xt+1 = X (wt, Rt+1, xt, ct+1) . (5)
2.2 Production
In the base mode, we assume that the economy has a standard neoclassical
production technology. Firms produce a single commodity in a competitive
market. The production function satisfies constant returns to scale with
respect to capital and labor. Thus the production technology is described by
a strictly concave and increasing function, yt = f (kt) , where kt is capital-
labor ratio and yt is labor productivity. Denoting the capital depreciation
rate by δ, the net rate of return to capital is thus given by f 0 (kt)− δ. Due to
the arbitrage condition, the gross rate of interest satisfies Rt = f
0 (kt)− δ +
1. In what follows, we assume that capital fully depreciates in one period,
that is, δ = 1. (This is a plausible assumption in the two-period lived OLG
economy in which one period can be 30 years long.) Therefore, we have
Rt = f
0 (kt) . (6)
Additionally, the competitive rate of real wage is given by
wt = f (kt)− ktf 0 (kt) . (7)
2.3 Dynamic System
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Since only young agents save, capital accumulation is determined by the
savings of young generation alone. Thus it holds that kt+1 = st so that from
(7) we obtain:
kt+1 = wt (kt)− ct. (8)
Consequently, (4), (5) and (8) constitute a first-order dynamic system with
respect to kt, ct and xt. Notice that, in view of the budget constraint the
household faces, xt+1 = Rt+1 (wt − ct) = Rt+1kt+1, which yields xt = Rtkt.
This means that (??) is written as
R (kt+1) kt+1 = X (w (kt) , R (kt+1) , R (kt) kt, ct+1) . (9)
Substituting (8) into (21) gives the following:
R (wt (kt)− ct) [wt (kt)− ct]
= X (w (kt) , R (wt (kt)− ct) , R (kt) kt, ct+1) . (10)
In sum, the dynamic behavior of the overlapping generations economy
with intergenerational as well as intragenerational consumption externali-
ties can be examined by inspecting (8) and (10) which describe motions of
capital-labor ratio, kt, and the young generation’s consumption, ct. It is worth
emphasizing that introduction of intergenerational consumption externalities
yields a two-dimensional dynamic system. In the standard Diamond model
of OLG economy can be reduced to a one-dimensional dynamic system of
capital stock, so that specification of the initial level of capital generally pins
down the equilibrium path of the economy. In contrast, in our model the ini-
tial level of capital, kt, alone cannot determines the equilibrium trajectory.
We need an additional condition, the initial level of ct (or kt+1) to select a
unique path. In this respect, the dynamic behavior of OLG model with con-
sumption externalities would be similar to that of the representative agent
economy.4
4It is to be noted that if intergenerational externalities are specifiedIn our notation, de
la Croix and Michel (1996) assume
Ut = u (ct, c¯t−1) + βu (xt+1) .
Namely, the parents’ consumption experices aﬀect childrens’ felicity. In this case demand
functions are given by
ct = C (wt, Rt+1, ct−1)
xt+1 = X (wt, Rt+1, ct−1) .
Letting zt = ct−1, the dynamic system is expressed as
kt+1 = w (kt)− C (w (kt) , R (kt+1) , zt)
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3 A Model with Specific Functional Forms
Although the dynamic system derived in the previous section is rather sim-
ple, it is diﬃcult to conduct a precise analysis without further specification
of the functional forms involved in the model. In this section, we specify
utility, production and external eﬀect functions in a simple manner. Such a
specification turns out to be helpful in order to confirm how the consider-
ation of consumption externalities may alter the dynamic behavior as well
as the steady-state characterization of the standard OLG model of capital
formation.
3.1 Preference Structure and Production Technology
We use one of the simplest forms of the utility function. The felicity
function of generation born at the beginning of period t is
Ut = log (ct + θEt) + β log (xt+1 + θEt+1)
The external eﬀects in each period are described by
Et = c¯t + ηx¯t, (11)
Et+1 = x¯t+1 + ηc¯t+1, (12)
where θ > −1 and η > 0. Parameter η expresses the relative magnitude
between the intragenerational and intergenerational consumption external-
ities. Notice that, given those functional forms, ∂u/∂Et = θ/ (ct + θEt+i)
and ∂2u/∂ct∂Et+i = −θ/ (ct + θEt+i)2. Therefore, if θ < 0, the functional
structure displays jealousy as well as KUJ. In contrast, if θ > 0, preferences
exhibit both admiration and RAJ.5 Obviously, the assumption of logarithmic
zt+1(= ct) = C (w (kt) , R (kt+1) , zt)
Thus we have a two-dimensional dynamic system of (kt, zt) . Note that in this case, the
initial values of kt and zt (= ct−1) are specified, equilibrium is in general,l determined
uniquely.
5A slight generalization of the log-utility function is
Ut =
(ct + θEt)
1−σ − 1
1− σ + β
(xt+1 + θEt+1)
1−σ − 1
1− σ , σ > 0, σ 6= 1.
In this case it still holds that θ < 0 means jealousy and KUJ, while θ > 0 yields admiration
and RAJ.
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utility function is highly restrictive. However, we show that even in this sim-
ple case, the presence of consumption externalities may give rise to complex
outcomes that cannot be observed in the standard framework.6
Give our specifications, the optimization condition (3) is written as
β(ct + θEt)
xt+1 + θEt+1
=
1
Rt+1
.
Solving (2) and (3) with respect to ct and xt+1 yields:
ct =
1
1 + β
wt +
θ
1 + β
µ
Et+1
Rt+1
− βEt
¶
, (13)
xt+1 =
βRt+1
1 + β
wt −
θRt+1
1 + β
µ
Et+1
Rt+1
− βEt
¶
. (14)
If there is no external eﬀect (θ = 0) , then we obtain ct = wt/ (1 + β) and
xt+1 = βRt+1wt/ (1 + β) . Since the utility function is logarithmic, the income
and substitution eﬀects of a change in the (expected) interest rate cancel each
other. In the presence of consumption externalities, however, a change in the
rate of interest in period t+ 1 aﬀects ct and xt+1 in such a way that
∂ct
∂Rt+1
= − θEt+1
(1 + β)R2t+1
,
∂xt+1
∂Rt+1
=
β
1 + β
(wt + θEt) .
Since wt > ct and ct + θEt > 0, we find that ∂xt+1/∂Rt+1 has a positive
value. The sign of ∂ct/∂Rt+1 depends on the sign of θ. In words, under the
given levels of external eﬀect, a rise in the interest rate increases (decreases)
consumption of the young period, if preferences exhibit jealousy and KUJ,
while it lowers ct if admiration and RAJ prevail.
In the symmetric equilibrium, it holds that c¯t = ct, x¯t = xt and c¯t+1 =
ct+1. Thus, using Et = ct + ηxt and Et+1 = xt+1 + ηct+1 we obtain
ct =
1
1 + β
wt +
θη
(1 + θ) (1 + β)
µ
ct+1
Rt+1
− βxt
¶
, (15)
6In this example, we assume that the external eﬀects are symmetric in both periods.
More generally, we may assume that
Ut = log (ct + θ0Et) + β log (xt+1 + θ1Et+1)
and
Et+i = c¯t+i + ηix¯t+i, i = 0, 1.
To avoid unnesseary classification, we focus on the case of symmetry where θ0 = θ1 = θ
and η0 = η1 = η.
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xt+1 =
βRt+1
1 + β
wt −
θηRt+1
(1 + θ) (1 + β)
µ
ct+1
Rt+1
− βxt
¶
. (16)
Notice that due to the assumption of −1 < θ, the signs of ∂ct/∂Rt+1 and
∂xt+1/∂Rt+1 are still the same as shown in (13) and (15) , even though the
intragenerational externalities are taken into account in calculating the sym-
metric equilibrium levels of ct and xt+1. It is also to be noted that (15) and
(16) demonstrate that if there is no intergenerational externalities (η = 0) ,
the external eﬀect on the equilibrium levels of ct and xt+1 disappears. This
shows that the intergenerational consumption externalities may play a piv-
otal role in our economy.
In this section, we assume that the production technology satisfies the
standard neoclassical properties and hence there is no external eﬀect in pro-
duction activities. We use a Cobb-Douglas function such that
yt = Ak
α
t , 0 < α < 1.
Therefore, the gross rate of interest and the real wage rate are respectively
given by
Rt = αAk
α−1
t , (17)
wt = (1− α)Akαt . (18)
Notice that the above relations give
wt
kt
=
µ
1
α
− 1
¶
Rt. (19)
3.2 Dynamic system and statedly state equilibrium
As pointed out in Section 2.2, we can obtain the following complete dy-
namic system by use of (8) , (15) , (17) and (18):
kt+1 = (1− α)Akαt − ct,
ct =
1
1 + β
(1− α)Akαt +
θη
(1 + θ) (1 + β)
µ
ct+1
αAkα−1t+1
− βαAkαt
¶
,
which describe dynamic behaviors of kt and ct. The second equation yields
ct+1 = αAk
α−1
t+1
∙
ct
D
+
µ
αβ − F
D
¶
Akat
¸
,
9
where
F =
1− α
1 + β
> 0, D =
ηθ
(1 + θ) (1 + β)
.
As a result, a complete system of (kt, ct) is presented by the following:
kt+1 = (1− α)Akαt − ct, (20)
ct+1 = αA [(1− α)Akαt − ct]
α−1
∙
ct
D
+
µ
αβ − F
D
¶
Akat
¸
. (21)
Equations (20) and (21) respectively correspond to the general expressions
(8) and (10) .
In the steady state equilibrium, kt and ct stay constant over time. Thus
the steady-state conditions are given by
c = (1− α)Akα − k,
c = αAkα−1
∙
c
D
+
µ
αβ − F
D
¶
Aka
¸
.
In order to characterize the steady-state equilibrium, it is convenient to use
Rt = αAk
α−1
t and rewrite the steady state conditions in the following way:
c
k
=
1− α
α
R− 1,
c
k
= R
∙
c/k
D
+
µ
β − F
αD
¶
R
¸
.
Eliminating c/k from the above two equations, we obtain
1− α
α
R− 1 = R
∙
1
D
µ
1− α
α
R− 1
¶
+
µ
β − F
αD
¶
R
¸
or
∙
β (1 + θ) (1− α)
αθη
+ β
¸
R2 −
∙
1− α
α
+
(1 + β) (1 + θ)
ηθ
¸
R+ 1 = 0. (22)
The solutions of this equation gives the steady state rate of interest rate and
it determines the steady-state values of kt, ct, wt and xt as well.
By inspecting (22), we find the following:
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Proposition 1 The steady-state equilibrium is uniquely determined if and
only if
1 + θ
ηθ
< −1− α
α
. (23)
There may exist dual steady states if
1 + θ
ηθ
> max
½
− α
1− α ,−
1− α
α (1 + β)
¾
. (24)
Proof. See Appendix A
If θ > 0, then condition (24) holds. As a result, if preferences show
admiration and RAJ and if the economy has a steady-state equilibrium,
there exist dual steady states. In addition, even if θ < 0, condition (24)
could be satisfied and thus dual steady state may emerge in the economy
where jealousy and KUJ prevail. By contrast, if θ < 0 and condition (23)
is satisfied, then the economy with jealousy and KUJ has a unique steady
state. To understand conditions (23) and (24) graphically, let us rewrite (22)
in the following way:
1
R
=
∙
1− α
α
+
(1 + β) (1 + θ)
ηθ
¸
−
∙
β (1 + θ) (1− α)
αθη
+ β
¸
R, (25)
Figure 1 (a) depicts the graphs of both sides of the above for the case where
condition (24) is satisfied. Figure 1 (b) shows the situation when condition
(23) is met. A change in external eﬀect parameter θ or η shifts the graph of
RHS of (25) . The eﬀect of a change in θ or η on the steady-state level of R
is, however, ambiguous in the analytical sense. We will conduct comparative
statics in the steady state numerically in Section 3.5.
3.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
In order to examine the local dynamics, let us linealize (20) and (21)
at the steady state equilibrium. Letting (k, c) be the steady state values of
(kt, ct) , we obtain: ∙
kt+1 − k
ct+1 − c
¸
= J
∙
kt − k
ct − c
¸
,
in which the coeﬃcient matrix J is given by
J =
∙
(1− α)R, −1
J21 J22
¸
,
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where
J21 =
"Ã
αβ − (1 + θ) (1− α)
θη
− (1− α)
3
α
!
R+ (1− α)2
#
R, (26)
J22 =
∙
(1 + θ) (1 + β)
θη
+
(1− α)2
α
¸
R+ α− 1. (27)
In the above, each element of the coeﬃcient matrix, J, is evaluated at the
steady state where R denotes the steady-state value of Rt determined by
(22) . (See Appendix B for the evaluation of elements in J.)
The trace and determinant of J are given by TrJ = (1− α)R + J22 and
det J = (1− α)RJ22+J21, respectively. If one of the eigenvalues is less than
one and the other is greater than one, the saddle point property is satisfied.
The condition for saddle stability is
(1 + Tr J + det J) (1− Tr J + det J) < 0. (28)
Additionally, if the following two conditions are met
(1 + Tr J + det J) (1− Tr J + det J) > 0. (29)
(detJ)2 < 0, (30)
then the absolute values of the both characteristic roots are less than one. In
this case, the system satisfies asymptotic stability. Thus if (29) and (30) hold,
the economy displays local indeterminacy of equilibrium. Since the coeﬃcient
matrix shown above contains the steady-state value of Rt that is a complex
function of given parameters of θ, η, α and β, stability of the dynamic system
is highly sensitive to the parameter values involved in the model. Although
it is possible to express (28) , (29) and (30) in terms of (θ, η,α, β) alone,
they are too complex to present useful economic interpretation. Therefore,
in what follows, we present numerical examples to examine the local behavior
of the model around the steady state.
3.4 Numerical Examples
We assume that the length of one period in our economy spans 30 years.
Thus if the annual discount rate is about 3.5%, the discount factor β =
(0.965)30 ' 0.343. In addition, according to the conventional specification,
we assume that the income share of capital, α, is 0.35. First, suppose that
preferences show admiration and RAJ. If θ = 0.2 and η = 1.0, then the
solution of (22) are R = 0.1056 and 2. 280.Letting the annual interest rate be
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r, the gross rate of interest in one period is (1 + r)30 . Since R = (1 + r)30−1,
the annual rate of interest corresponding to the steady-state values R =
0.1056 and 2.28 are respectively r ' 0.003 and r ' 0.04. Evaluating the
coeﬃcient matrix J by the steady state value of R = 0.1056, we find that
the characteristic roots of J are 0.343 and 0.483. This means that the steady
state with a lower value of R (so that a higher value of the steady state level
of k) is a sink. Since the initial value of ct is not predetermined in our system,
the steady state with a higher capital stock is locally indeterminate and thus
sunspot-driven fluctuations may be observed. On the other hand, at the
steady state with R = 2.28, the characteristic roots of J are 0.202 and 21.
422. Therefore, the steady state with a lower capital stock has a saddlepoint
property, which means that the equilibrium path is locally determinate.
If θ = 0.4 and η = 1.0, the steady-state levels of R are 0.162 and 2.345.
In this case, the characteristic roots of J are 0.695 and 0.346 for R = 0.162,
while they are 0.35 and 14. 43 for R = 2.345. Again, the steady state with a
high level of capital is locally indeterminate. In a similar manner, assuming
that α = 0.35 and β = 0.341, we change the values of θ and η to examine the
local stability of each steady state. We find that for a wide range of values
of θ and η, the stability of each steady state mentioned above still holds: the
steady state with a higher capital stock is locally indeterminate, while the
steady state with a lower capital is determinate.
Now suppose that preferences exhibit jealousy and KUJ. If we set θ =
−0.2 and η = 1.0, condition (23) holds so that the feasible steady state is
unique. In this case, we find that the steady state value of R is 1.85 and
that characteristic roots of J are −7. 52 and 0.369. Thus the unique steady
state is a saddle point and local determinacy holds. If θ = −0.4 and η = 1.0,
then R = 1.456 and characteristic roots of J are −1. 257 and 0.367. Again,
the saddle point property holds. However, if θ = −0.5 and η = 1.0, then
R = 1.254. In this case characteristic roots of J are −0.500 7 and 0.486, so
that the steady state is a sink. At the same time, if θ = −0.5 but η = 0.5,
then R = 1.72 and the characteristic roots of J are −2. 571 and 0.487.These
examples indicate that the possibility of indeterminacy increases with the
magnitude of external eﬀect.
Table 1 summarizes typical examples. Here,H and L respectively indicate
that the steady state with a higher and lower rate of return to capital.
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θ η R Local determinacy
0.4 1.0 RH = 2.345, RL = 0.162, H determinate, L indeterminate
0.2 1.0 RH = 2.281, RL = 0.105 H determinate, L indeterminate
0.2 0.5 RH = 2.008, RL = 0.057 H determinate, L indeterminate
0.1 1.0 RH = 2.208, RL = 0.062 H determinate, L indeterminate
−0.1 1.0 2.002 determinate
−0.2 1.0 1.850 determinate
−0.5 0.5 1.702 determinate
−0.4 1.0 1.465 indeterminate
−0.42 1.0 1.375 indeterminate
−0.45 1.0 1.299 indeterminate
Table 1
3.5 Intuition
To obtain intuitive implication of the stability results shown above, as-
sume that the economy initially stays in the steady-state equilibrium. Now,
suppose that there is a sunspot-driven expectation change and the agents
born at the beginning of period t anticipate that the consumption demand of
young agents in the next period (period t+ 1) will increase. Remember that
from (15) and (16) the consumption demand functions of the agents born in
period t are written as
ct =
1
1 + β
wt +
θη
(1 + θ) (1 + β)
ct+1
Rt+1
− βθη
(1 + θ) (1 + β)
xt, (31)
xt+1 =
βRt+1
1 + β
wt −
θη
(1 + θ) (1 + β)
ct+1 +
βθηRt+1
(1 + θ) (1 + β)
xt. (32)
Therefore, if admiration and RAJ prevail (θ > 0), an anticipated rise in ct+1
increases ct so that capital formation in period t+1 falls. A decrease in capital
then raises the marginal product of capital and thus Rt+1 will increase. Since
there are two steady states in the case of θ > 0, the magnitude of impact of
the rise in Rt+1 depends on which steady state the economy initially stays.
If the economy initially is in the steady state with a lower level of capital (so
a higher rate of R), a rise in kt+1 makes a large increment of Rt+1, because
the productivity function satisfies strict concavity. This means that in view
of (31) , the positive eﬀect of the increase in Rt+1 on xt+1 may dominate the
negative external eﬀect created by a rise in ct+1. In this case, both ct+1 and
xt+1 are anticipated to rise, which contradicts the fact that a rise in ct reduces
capital accumulation so that product in t + 1 will fall. Consequently, the
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initial anticipation cannot be self-fulfilled and the sunspot-driven fluctuations
will not emerge.
On the other hand, if the economy initially stays in the steady state
with a lower level of capital, the initial rate of return is high. Again, the
anticipated increase in ct+1 lowers kt+1 and increases Rt+1. Since the initial
capital stock is suﬃciently large, a fall in kt+1 yields a small increase in Rt+1.
Hence, the positive eﬀect of a rise in Rt+1 on xt+1 is relatively small, so
that the anticipated rise in ct+1 may decrease xt+1. As a result, the total
consumption in period t + 1 may fall, which makes the initial expectation
change self-fulfilled. The local indeterminacy is thus observable around the
steady state with a larger level of capital.
Next, consider the case of jealousy and KUJ (θ < 0).When θ is negative,
an anticipated increase in ct+1 raises ct, and hence kt+1 will increase. This
lowers Rt+1 so that there is a negative impact on xt+1. In addition, if θ and η
are small, (32) shows that a rise in ct+1 produces a small increment in xt+1.
Consequently, the increase in total consumption in period t + 1 is not large
enough to meet the rise in output generated by the increase in savings in
period t. Conversely, if θ and η are high enough, a rise in ct+1 will increase
xt+1 despite the presence of negative eﬀect of the fall in the interest rate. If
this is the case, the initial anticipation can be self fulfilled: there may exist
a continuum of stable paths around the steady state.
4 Endogenous Growth
In this section we introduce production externalities into the base model in
order to re-examine the main findings in the previous section in the context
of endogenous growth. We now assume that the production function of each
firm is
yt = Ak
α
t k¯
1−α
t , 0 < α < 1.
Here, following Romer (1986), k¯t denotes the average capital-labor ration that
represents the external eﬀects generated by technological diﬀusion. There-
fore, in the absence of consumption externalities, the model structure in this
section is essentially the same as one used by Grossman and Yanagawa (1994)
who examine the welfare eﬀect of bubble in an endogenously growing econ-
omy with overlapping generations. If we normalize the number of firms to
one, the symmetric equilibrium requires that k¯t = kt. Using this condition,
the social technology internalizing the external eﬀect becomes yt = Akt and
the gross rate of return to capital and the real wage rate are respectively
given by
Rt (kt) = αA = R, (33)
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w (kt) = (1− α)Akt. (34)
4.1 Dynamics with Endogenous Growth
In our endogenous growth setting, the real interest rate is fixed. As
a result, only diﬀerence between the neoclassical and endogenous growth
versions of the dynamic system is that the latter assumes that Rt constant
over time. Hence, in the case of endogenous growth, the dynamic system
with the neoclassical technology (20) and (21) are reduced to:
kt+1 = (1− α)Akt − ct,
ct+1 = αA
∙
ct
D
+
µ
αβ − F
D
¶
Akt
¸
.
Denoting the gross rate of capital formation by kt+1/kt = Gt, we see that the
above can be rewritten as
Gt = (1− α)A− zt,
zt+1 =
αA
Gt
∙
zt
D
+
µ
αA− F
D
¶
A
¸
.
Using these equations, we may drive a complete dynamic system with a single
variable, Gt, as follows:
Gt+1 =
µ
1
α
− 1
¶
R+
R (1 + θ) (1 + β)
θη
−
"
1 +
(1 + θ)
¡
1
α − 1
¢
θη
#
βR2
Gt
. (35)
This equation presents a reduced dynamic system that summarizes an en-
dogenous growth version of our base model.
4.2. The Balanced-Growth Path and Equilibrium Dynamics
In the balanced-growth equilibrium, kt, ct and xt grow at a common rate.
The balanced-growth rate is given by the solution of the following equation:7
G =
µ
1
α
− 1
¶
R+
R (1 + θ) (1 + β)
θη
−
"
1 +
(1 + θ)
¡
1
α − 1
¢
θη
#
βR2
G
. (36)
Using (36) , we find:
7Note that if we set G = 1 in the following equation (36) , we obtain the steady-state
equation (22) for the exogenous growth model.
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Proposition 2 When preferences show admiration and RAJ (θ > 0) , then
there may exist dual balanced-growth paths. When preferences exhibit jealousy
and KUJ (θ < 0) , then there exists a unique balanced-growth equilibrium if
1 +
(1 + θ)
¡
1
α − 1
¢
θη
< 0, (37)
while there may exist dual balanced-growth paths if
1 +
(1 + θ)
¡
1
α − 1
¢
θη
> 0 and
µ
1
α
− 1
¶
R+
R (1 + θ) (1 + β)
θη
> 0. (38)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Employing the same numerical examples as those in Section 3.4, we find
that (37) tends to hold when θ < 0. (If α = 0.35, (37) holds even if θ = −0.5
and η = 1.0.) Thus, given plausible parameter values, the endogenously
growing economy with jealousy and KUJ generally has a unique balanced-
growth equilibrium.
It is easy to examine the local behavior of the economy around the
balanced-growth equilibrium. Figures 2 (a) and 2 (b) are the phase dia-
grams of (35) . Figure 2(a) corresponds to the case where conditions in (38)
hold. As figure shows, the stationary point with a lower growth rate is unsta-
ble and that with a higher growth rate is stable. Therefore, since the initial
value of kt+1 (so Gt) is not predetermined in this system, the low-growth
steady state is locally determinate, while the high-growth steady state is lo-
cally indeterminate. This conclusion is similar to the stability results shown
in the numerical examples for the case of exogenous growth: the steady state
with high economic activities displays indeterminacy, while the steady state
with low economic activities holds determinacy of equilibrium in the case of
admiration and RAJ.
Figure 2(b) is for the case of jealousy and KUJ where (37) is satisfied.
The balanced-growth path is uniquely given and the local stability can be
determined by inspecting the following:
dGt+1
dGt
¯¯¯¯
Gt=G
=
"
1 +
(1 + θ)
¡
1
α − 1
¢
θη
#
βR2
G2
(39)
If the absolute value of the RHS of the above is higher than one, the stationary
point is locally unstable so that the economy always stays on the balanced-
growth path and local determinacy of equilibrium holds. If the absolute
value of RHS of (39) is strictly less than one, then the growth rate cyclically
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converges to its steady-stage value. Thus indeterminacy holds around the
balanced-growth path. Equation (39) means that, other things being equal,
the absolute value of the right hand side becomes small when G is large.
However, G is a function of other parameters, the magnitude of dGt+1
dGt
¯¯¯
Gt=G
depends totally on the values of (α,β, θ, η) . To sum up, we find:
Proposition 3 If there are dual balanced-growth equilibria, the balanced-
growth path with a lower growth rate is locally determinate, while that with a
higher growth rate is locally indeterminate. If preferences show jealousy and
KUJ and if the balanced-growth path is uniquely given, then determinacy of
equilibrium depends on the parameter values involved in the model.
In order to examine the stability conditions more specifically, we consider
some numerical examples in the next subsection.
4.3. Numerical Examples
Since in our endogenous growth setting, the rate of return to capital
R = αA is fixed, we should specify the value of productivity parameter A.
To do so, we set a bench mark long-term growth rate that the economy
without consumption externalities realizes. First, notice that if there is no
consumption external eﬀect, the dynamic behavior of capital is determined
by kt+1 = βwt/ (1 + β) so that
kt+1 =
β (1− α)A
1 + β
kt.
This means that the economy stays on the balanced growth path at the outset
and the balanced growth rate is given by
G =
β (1− α)A
1 + β
. (40)
As a benchmark example, we assume that the balanced growth rate in the
absence of consumption externalities is 2% per year. Thus G in (40) equals
(1.02)30 = 1. 811 4.
As before, we set α = 0.35 and β = 0.341, so that β (1− α) / (1 + β) =
0.165. Thus we should assume that A = 1.811/0.165 = 10.976. If this is the
case, the rate of return to capital R = αA = (0.35) (10.976) = 3. 841 6, which
means that the annual rate of return is about 4.5%. Given those values,
suppose that θ = −0.2 and η = 1.0. This case ensures that there is a unique
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balanced-growth path and the balanced growth rate is G = 2.057. Given this
condition, (39) shows that
dGt+1
dGt
¯¯¯¯
Gt=2.057
= −9.34.
Hence, the dynamic system is locally unstable and the equilibrium is de-
terminate. Similarly, if θ = −0.4 and η = 1.0, we have G = 2.606 and
dGt+1/dGt = −1.224, so that determinacy still holds. However, if we set
θ = −0.5 and η = 1.0, then G = 3.257 and dGt+1/dGt = −0.394. In this
case, the balanced-growth path is locally stable, which means that the equi-
librium path around the balanced-growth equilibrium is indeterminate. That
is, sunspot-driven growth cycle may be observed. As well as the case of ex-
ogenous growth, we see that a higher degree of external eﬀect (i.e. a larger
absolute value of θ) increases both the balanced-growth rate and possibility
of sunspots and indeterminacy. More specifically, the minimum magnitude
of θ that generates intermediacy is around 0.42 if η = 1.0. Actually, when
θ = −0.42 and η = 1.0, then G = 2.785 and dGt+1/dGt = −0.992, which
ensures the local stability of the balanced-growth path, which generates local
intermediacy.
Finally, as for the case of admiration and RAJ, the balanced-growth rates
areG = 6.95 and 30.67 when θ = 0.2 and η = 1.0, that is, the higher balanced
growth rate is about 12% per year and the lower one is about 6.05% per year.
If θ = 0.1 and η = 0.5, then G = 6.886 and 56.225. In the latter economy
annually grows at 15%. When θ = 0.4 and η = 1.0, we obtain G = 7.12
and 17.77 (the annual growth rates are about 6.5% and 10%, respectively).
Consequently, under our specification, a higher degree of externality enhances
growth in the low-growth steady state, while it lowers the growth rate in the
high growth steady state. It is also to be noted that in the case of admiration
and RAJ, introducing a small external eﬀect will give rise to a drastic change
in the long-term growth performance of the economy.
Table 2 summarizes typical examples under the assumption that α = 0.35
and β = 0.341. In this tableH means the balanced-growth path with a higher
growth rate, while L shows one with a lower growth rate.
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θ η G Local determinacy
0.4 1.0 GH = 17.772, GL = 7.121 H indeterminate, L determinate
0.2 1.0 GH = 30.674, GL = 6.957 H indeterminate, L determinate
0.2 0.5 GH = 56.225, GL = 6.885 H indeterminate, L determinate
−0.1 1.0 1.900 determinate
−0.2 1.0 2.057 determinate
−0.5 0.5 2.301 determinate
−0.4 1.0 2.686 determinate
−0.42 1.0 2.785 indeterminate
−0.45 1.0 2.949 indeterminate
Table 2
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has extended the standard OLG model of capital accumulation
by introducing consumption externalities. By using a model with simple
functional forms, we have shown that the presence of consumption external
eﬀects may produce fundamental eﬀects on the dynamic behavior as well as
on the steady-state characterization of the model economy. Our findings have
demonstrated that, consumption externalities may play a more fundamental
role in an overlapping generations economy than in the representative-agent
counterpart. The main reason for such a diﬀerence is that in the OLG set-
ting, the contemporaneous external eﬀects involve not only intragenerational
but also intergenereationa interactions among the consumers. We have con-
firmed that the intergenreational externalities would be pivotal in generating
complex dynamics in the standard OLG model of capital accumulation.
In this paper we have restrict our attention to analyze working of the
simplified model. As for possible extension of our argument, two topics seem
to deserve further investigation. First, it would be interesting to investigate
various policy issues in our framework. A sample may include: transitional ef-
fects of fiscal policies, the optimal taxation scheme that considers transitional
process as well as steady state, social security, fiscal policy and government
debt, and the relation between eﬃciency and bubbles.
Second, since the dynamic behavior of model economy is sensitive to
the preference structure, it is useful to re-examine our findings by using
alternative specification of preferences. For example, following Gal´ı (1994)
and Abel (2003), we may assume that the externalities are introduced in a
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multiplicative form such that
Ut =
c1−σt E
θσ
t
1− σ + β
x1−σt+1E
θσ
t+1
1− σ , σ > 0
where Et = c¯tx¯
η
t and Et+1 = x¯t+1c¯
η
t+1. In this formulation, we have four
combinations: (i) admiration and RAJ if θ > 0 and σ > 1; (ii) admiration
and KUJ if θ > 0 and 0 < σ < 1; (iii) jealousy and RAJ if θ < 0 and σ > 1,
and; (iv) jealousy and KUJ if θ < 0 and 0 < σ < 1. Although in this case
only numerical experiments can deal with dynamics of the model, examining
alternative preference structures will be useful to check robustness of the
results obtained in this paper.
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Appendices
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Define
Λ (R) =
β
1 + β
µ
1− α
α
+
ηθ
1 + θ
¶
R2
−
∙
1 +
(1− α)
(1 + β)α
µ
β +
ηθ
1 + θ
¶¸
R+
ηθ
α (1 + θ) (1 + β)
The root of Λ (R) = 0 gives the steady state value of the gross rate of return
to capital. It is to be note that
Λ (0) =
ηθ
α (1 + θ) (1 + β)
,
Λ (1) =
θη
1 + θ
− 1 < 0
It is easy to confirm that if θ > 0, (so that Λ (0) > 0), then Λ (R) = 0 has two
positive roost, one is in between 0 and 1, and the other is higher than 1. Since
R should be larger than 1, the economy has a unique, feasible steady state.
On the other hand, if θ < 0, then Λ (0) < 0. Therefore, when 1−αα +
ηθ
1+θ > 0,
equation Λ (R) = 0 has one positive and one negative roots. Since Λ (1) < 0,
the positive root is higher than 1, which means that the feasible steady state
is uniquely determined. However, if 1−αα +
ηθ
1+θ < 0, Λ (R) = 0 has two positive
roots. In this case, both roots are larger than 1, if and only if
β
1 + β
µ
1− α
α
+
ηθ
1 + θ
¶
> 1 +
(1− α)
(1 + β)α
µ
β +
ηθ
1 + θ
¶
.
B. Evaluation of the coeﬃcient matrix J.
Using the steady-state conditions (), () and R = αAkα, each element
in the coeﬃcient matrix of the linearized dynamic system evaluated at the
steady state are written as follows:
dkt+1
dkt
= α (1− α)Akα−1 = (1− α)R, dkt+1
dct
= −1
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J21 =
dct+1
dkt
= αA (1− α)
£
α (α− 1)Akα−1
¤
[(1− α)Akα − c]α−2
×
∙
c
D
+
µ
αβ − F
D
¶
Akα
¸
+ αA [(1− α)Akα − c]α−1
µ
αβ − F
D
¶
αAkα−1
= − (1− α)2Rc
k
+
µ
αβ − F
D
¶
R2
=
"Ã
αβ − F
D
− (1− α)
3
α
!
R+ (1− α)2
#
R.
J22 =
dct+1
dct
= −αA (1− α) [(1− α)Akα − c]α−2
∙
c
D
+
µ
αβ − F
D
¶
Akα
¸
+αA [(1− α)Akα − c]α−1 1
D
= (1− α) c
k
+
R
D
=
µ
1
D
+
(1− α)2
α
¶
R+ α− 1.
In calculations dct+1/dkt and dct+1/dct, we use
£
c
D
+
¡
αβ − F
D
¢
Akα
¤
= c/R
and c/k = 1−αα R− 1, both of which come from () and () .
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Define the following function:
Ω (G) = G2−
∙µ
1
α
− 1
¶
R+
R (1 + θ) (1 + β)
θη
¸
G+βR2
"
1 +
(1 + θ)
¡
1
α − 1
¢
θη
#
.
Equation Ω (G) = 0 may have two positive roots ifµ
1
α
− 1
¶
R+
R (1 + θ) (1 + β)
θη
> 0 and 1 +
(1 + θ)
¡
1
α − 1
¢
θη
> 0.
Since those conditions are satisfied if θ > 0, the case of admiration and RAJ
would yield dual balanced growth rates. On the other hand, if θ < 0 and
1 +
(1 + θ)
¡
1
α − 1
¢
θη
< 0,
then Ω (G) = 0 has one positive root. Thus in this case there is unique
balanced-growth equilibrium.
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